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Abstract
We characterize, more precisely than before, what Rawls calls the ‘analytical’ method of
drawing up a list of basic liberties. This method employs one or more general con-
ditions that, under any just social order whatever, putative entitlements must meet for
them to be among the basic liberties encompassed, within some just social order, by
Rawls’s first principle of justice (i.e. the liberty principle). We argue that the general
conditions that feature in Rawls’s own account of the analytical method, which employ
the notion of necessity, are too stringent. They ultimately fail to deliver as basic certain
particular liberties that should be encompassed within any fully adequate scheme of
liberties. To address this under-generation problem, we provide an amended general
condition. This replaces Rawls’s necessity condition with a probabilistic condition and it
appeals to the standard liberal prohibition on arbitrary coercion by the state. We
defend our new approach both as apt to feature in applications of the analytical
method and as adequately grounded in justice as fairness as Rawls articulates the
theory’s fundamental ideas.
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While it is widely held that some liberties are more important than others, there
has been considerable controversy about which liberties count as basic and which
do not. Some theorists have held that such moral rights as the right to engage in
sit-ins and mass picketing during strikes, or to participate in other forms of direct
action, do not count as, and can take priority over, freedoms that liberals tend to
regard as basic (Gourevitch, 2018; Raekstad and Rossi, 2021). The question has
also arisen as to whether a right to an element of workplace democracy, or eco-
nomic democracy, is basic by liberal lights (Clark and Gintis, 1978; Gourevitch,
2014; McLeod, 2018; O’Neill, 2008). Moreover, there is a prominent and ongoing
controversy about whether certain laissez-faire economic freedoms qualify, as
Tomasi (2012a, 2012b) argues, as basic liberties.1
Such controversies have important consequences for political philosophy and its
applications. Like Arnold (2018) and Brennan (2020), we are concerned with the
underlying question, about which there is also controversy, of how to draw the
distinction (that Flanigan, 2018 considers unfounded) between basic and non-basic
liberties. That is: how are liberals and their critics to decide as to which liberties
are, according to liberalism, the most important or basic? Focusing on Rawls’s
account of the basic liberties will enable us to recognize and address some intri-
cacies that arise when attempting to answer this question.
There is also a wider context. Rawls’s version of high liberalism can be seen as
driving a wedge between classical liberalism and left liberalism via its favoured list
of basic liberties. As Brennan (2020: 493) explains, Rawls’s list excludes both
economic liberties that classical liberalism includes, and social liberties that left
liberalism includes. This shows that deciding what makes its way onto the list of
basic liberties is not merely an exercise in ‘list-drawing’. It is really a debate about
the fate of liberalism and particularly about which version of liberalism, if any, it is
fitting to accept. Our contribution in this article can thus be seen as an intervention
in this debate, albeit, as we explain below, in a way more fundamental than merely
arguing that one liberty or another makes it onto the list.
Rawls (2005 [1993]: 290) writes that there are two phases involved in providing a
defensible specification of the basic liberties. The first involves specifying a list of
basic liberties under general headings. The second involves further specification of
this list by determining the significance of different particular liberties that come
under the same general heading and adjudicating over conflicts between them. For
example, after Nickel (1994: 780), while in the first phase freedom of movement is
recognized as a basic liberty, in the second phase it is recognized that certain
particular liberties of movement (e.g. going on holiday) are much less important
than others (e.g. attending a political rally).
Further, Rawls (2001: 44, citing 1971: 61, cf. 2005 [1993]: 450) remarks that ‘the
basic liberties are specified by a list’. Rawls (2001: 45, cf. 2005 [1993]: 292–293)
distinguishes between ‘historical’ and ‘analytical’ ways of drawing up a list.
Proceeding historically, ‘we survey various democratic regimes and assemble a
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list of rights and liberties that seem basic and are securely protected in what seem
to be [. . .] the more successful regimes’ (Rawls, 2001: 45). Presumably, in doing
this, we are guided by the functional role that the basic liberties play within the
theory of justice as fairness, rather than by a pre-existent list, however incomplete,
of putatively basic liberties. We are to examine democratic regimes and identify
which liberties commonly play, or approximate to playing, that functional role
within them. Proceeding analytically, ‘we consider what liberties provide the polit-
ical and social conditions essential for the adequate development and full exercise
of the two moral powers of free and equal persons’ (Rawls, 2001: 45). We can also
mix the two methods, giving a hybrid method.2
There is, however, an important ambiguity in the notion of specification. To
clarify matters, let us distinguish between specification as process and specification
as a result of that process. Specification as process is what Rawls (2001: 45) calls
‘drawing up a list’. An actual list of the basic liberties itself is, or is part of, a
specification as result. The historical, analytical and hybrid methods are ways of
carrying out the process of specification. In our terminology, the process of spec-
ification of the basic liberties consists in the application, within an epistemic situ-
ation, of a method (whether analytical, historical or hybrid), in order to arrive at a
list of the basic liberties.
We focus upon the analytical method. We distinguish between the method itself
and the setting out of general conditions apt for deployment as part of any appli-
cation of that method. These general conditions are ones that, under any just social
order whatever, putative entitlements must meet for them to be among the basic
liberties encompassed, within some just social order, by Rawls’s first principle of
justice (i.e. the liberty principle3).
These general conditions are to be deployed in all particular applications, which
tend towards variation in their outcomes across different democratic regimes, of
the analytical method of specifying the basic liberties. The general conditions
determine what it is to be a basic liberty in the sense that they concern the intension
of the concept basic liberty, not its extension. By contrast, the ultimate aim of the
process of specification is to identify the concept’s extension. As we have previ-
ously observed, we can also use the word ‘specification’ to refer to the result of that
process, namely a list of basic liberties (in the first phase, specified at a high level of
abstraction and, in the second, more particularly specified and within ‘a fully
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties’, as Rawls (2005 [1993]: 42) puts it).
Our main concern is with the general conditions pertinent to each phase of any
process of analytical specification of the basic liberties. Arrival at general condi-
tions appropriate for application in analytical specification of the basic liberties is,
we take it, a theoretical task that takes place as part of the setting up of justice as
fairness as a theory. It is distinct from the task of drawing up a list of the basic
liberties in that the latter, and not the former, takes place, with increasing partic-
ularity, over the four stages of the four-stage sequence (Freeman, 2007: 73; Rawls,
2005 [1993]: 289–371; Wenar, 2017: §4.9). We reserve the term ‘specification’ for
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the process of carrying out this task, done using one of the three available methods,
and for its result.
Our main task, then, is to render more precise the concept of basic liberty, rather
than to settle questions about its extension. Fully settling the concept’s extension is
not a matter for philosophers only: rather, it is the same task as the provision of a
full specification of the basic liberties. A full specification, as we understand it,
includes a full list of particular basic liberties that feature within an overall scheme
of liberty. Accordingly, the settling of the concept’s extension must take place
across both phases of specification, and the stages of the four-stage sequence.
The task in which we are engaged is the determination of the general conditions
apt to feature in any application of the analytical method. This task is prior to, and
importantly distinct from, that of analytically specifying the basic liberties (in the
first and second phases of specification). We aim to clarify what the analytical
method is and to provide tools, in the form of the aforementioned general con-
ditions, for its application.
In the literature, answers to the question of what it is for a liberty to be basic (as
against mere lists of putatively basic liberties) do not abound (cf. Pettit, 2008: 201,
203). Rawls’s account is primarily a ‘functionalist’ one: it concentrates mainly on
the role that the basic liberties play, rather than dwelling, in detail, upon defining
what they are. Moreover, his account of the analytical method itself, and of the
general conditions pertinent to it, is relatively sparse. We aim to expand upon it,
criticize it and improve upon it.
We interpret Rawls’s account of what makes a liberty basic in terms of what
we call the ‘necessity reading’. Rawls defines as basic those liberties that are
necessary for the full and informed exercise of what Rawls considers our two
moral powers. We then turn to Rawls’s general condition for use in the second
phase of specification. This appeals to what Rawls depicts as the exercise of the
moral powers in the two fundamental cases. We argue that, coupled with the
necessity reading, invoking the two fundamental cases is too strong. It under-
generates: i.e. it excludes some particular basic liberties that it should not, such
as certain forms of freedom of movement. We then discuss a new approach that
seeks to resolve this problem. On the new approach, probability takes over the
role that was occupied, on Rawls’s approach and some variants of it, by
modality.
We proceed to show, however, that the probabilistic approach remains
extensionally inadequate. We argue, by appeal to the case of the freedom to
produce or consume political satire, that it also under-generates. We go on to
propose a remedy for this problem. This adds as a sufficient (but non-
necessary) condition upon a particular liberty’s being basic that any restrictions
upon it that did not promote, or which were not designed to promote, the
weighting of liberties in a scheme of liberty would be arbitrarily coercive. From
a specifically Rawlsian perspective, such restrictions would breach the liberal
principle of legitimacy.
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Rawls’s proposal: A reconstruction
Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness regards citizens as persons engaged in
social co-operation who have ‘two moral powers’, namely the capacity to have a
sense of justice and the capacity to have a conception of the good (Rawls, 2001:
18–19). The principles of justice concern the design of the basic structure of society,
that is:
the way in which the main political and social institutions of a society fit together into
one system of social co-operation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and
regulate the division of advantages that arise from social co-operation over time.
(Rawls, 2001: 10)
The fundamental case in which the capacity for a sense of justice is exercised is
in ‘the application of the principles of justice to the basic structure and its social
policies’ (Rawls, 2001: 112). The fundamental case in which the capacity for a
conception of the good is exercised is in ‘forming, revising, and rationally pursuing
such a conception over a complete life’ (Rawls, 2001: 113).
The two moral powers and their exercise in the two fundamental cases feature
importantly in the conditions that Rawls thinks a liberty must meet if it is to be a
‘basic’ particular liberty. As explained earlier, such a liberty is one that emerges
from each of the two phases of specification as (what we call) a ‘core’ basic liberty.
It is a particular case of the basic liberties identified (under general headings) in the
first phase and it is identified, in the second phase, as being of substantial political
significance.
Although Rawls does not pursue the matter in detail, he seems to intend that the
analytical method should be apt to be invoked during both phases of specification.
For Rawls, a liberty is basic if and only if it is necessary to the provision of ‘the social
conditions essential for the adequate development and the full and informed exercise
of [people’s] two moral powers [. . .] in [at least one of] the two fundamental cases’
(Rawls, 2001: 112; our italics).4 Necessity to the ‘adequate development and the
full and informed exercise’ of the moral powers is Rawls’s general condition for use
in the first phrase of specification. The supplementation of this with the appeal to
the two fundamental cases provides his general condition for use in the second
phase. Evidently, it is not only the possession of the two moral powers that is
essential to a person’s being a free and equal citizen; it is also the exercise of
them, in the two fundamental cases (Nickel, 1994: 773; Rawls, 2001: 43, 112).
The basic liberties pertain to Rawls’s first principle of justice, that: ‘Each person
has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties,
which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all [. . .]’ (Rawls,
2001: 42). This is why the exercise of our moral powers in respect of the two
fundamental cases is ‘essential to us as free and equal citizens’ (Rawls, 2001: 45)
and no trade-offs are to be made of basic liberties for other social primary goods
(Rawls, 2001: 46–47).
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Let us briefly consider three challenges to our account of the analytical method.
First, perhaps the conception of the analytical method with which we are working,
according to which any version of the analytical method employs a definition of the
basic liberties, is one that Rawls would have considered alien.5 We do not see,
however, how the analytical method, as a general method (i.e. rather than by ref-
erence to a specific version of it) could otherwise viably be characterized. Even if
Rawls did not intend to provide a definition, we do not see how that task can
properly be regarded as dispensable.
Second, it could be asked whether the appeal to the two fundamental cases does
indeed play a role in Rawls’s account of the basic liberties.6 While it is true that
Rawls does not always mention the two fundamental cases in some relevant con-
texts (e.g. Rawls, 2001: 45, 2005 [1993]: 293), he does mention them in others (e.g.
Rawls, 2001: 112, 2005 [1993]: 308). Philosophically, either the two fundamental
cases are to be invoked in the first phase of specification or they become relevant
only in the second phase; there does not seem to be reason not to invoke them at all
given the specifics of the Rawlsian system. We believe, with Nickel (1994: 780–781)
and in view of Rawls (2005 [1993]: 332–335), that the latter is the correct interpre-
tation. The appeal to the two fundamental cases serves to help us to specify which
particular liberties under an already selected (first-phase) basic liberty, specified at
a higher level of abstraction, are of particular political importance (i.e. which are
the core areas of that basic liberty).
Finally, one could argue that we read Rawls too strongly: it is the notion of
enabling, not that of necessity, that is really relevant to understanding Rawls. In
particular, after he gives the above general conditions, Rawls remarks that ‘equal
political liberties and freedom of thought enable citizens’ to judge ‘the justice of the
basic structure of society and its social policies’ and that ‘liberty of conscience and
freedom of association enable citizens’ to form, to revise and rationally to pursue
‘their conceptions of the good’ (Rawls, 2001: 45; our italics). This is an interesting
modal shift. Rawls’s general condition (for the first phase of specification) appeals
to the essentiality/necessity of the basic liberties to the full and informed exercise of
the moral powers. The explanatory remarks just quoted appeal to the weaker claim
that the basic liberties enable this.7
The notion of enabling, however, cannot be the right notion to feature in an
extensionally adequate definition of the basic liberties (cf. Brennan, 2020: 503; von
Platz, 2014: 29). While all social primary goods enable the full and informed
exercise of the moral powers (Rawls, 2005 [1993]: 307, cf. 2001: 57), not all
social primary goods are basic liberties. Therefore, if enabling were to supplant
necessity in the definition of the basic liberties, the resultant definition would be
too permissive to be consistent with Rawlsian liberalism. No doubt, basic liberties,
being social primary goods, have an enabling function, but that is true of all social
primary goods and not only of the basic liberties (cf. Melenovsky, 2018: 434).
While enabling is a necessary condition for a social primary good to qualify as a
basic liberty (since the basic liberties are among the social primary goods), it is not
a necessary and sufficient condition.
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From modality to probability
We have no immediate quarrel with the proposed necessity reading as providing a
general condition apt for application in the first phase of specification, fit to pro-
vide a means of identifying the basic liberties at a high level of abstraction (cf.
Nickel, 1994: 783–786). Nevertheless, we contend, it provides an inappropriate
general condition for the second phase of specification.
Is the presence of the basic liberties a necessary condition for the full and
informed exercise of the moral powers in the two fundamental cases? A positive
answer to that question is not, if we are to be charitable to Rawls, to be construed
as suggesting that, for each individual citizen in a given society, the full and
informed exercise of the moral powers in the two fundamental cases is possible
only if all citizens possess the basic liberties (after Melenovsky and Bernstein, 2015:
50; cf. Melenovsky, 2018: 442–443). Highly developed moral and political sensi-
bilities, including the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity to have a
conception of the good, may be present and exercised, even to a relatively high
degree, in populations living under regimes in which the basic liberties recognized
by Rawls are not afforded equally to all citizens: e.g. in the United Kingdom
before universal suffrage, or in contemporary Cuba. Living under such a regime
lessens the likelihood that people will be able, in a full and informed way, to
exercise their moral powers in the two fundamental cases but it would not neces-
sarily make it impossible for them to do so. While governmental refusal to afford
equal basic liberties may place limits upon these two moral powers and their
exercise in the two fundamental cases, it need not make these powers and their
exercise in the two fundamental cases impossible for each and every citizen (cf.
Arnold, 2018: §3; Brennan, 2020: 499–500).
Recall that for Rawls (2001: 112) a liberty is basic if and only if it is necessary to
the provision of ‘the social conditions essential for the adequate development’ and/
or ‘the full’ and/or ‘informed exercise of [people’s] two moral powers [. . .] in [at
least one of] the two fundamental cases’. Our interpretation of this is that a liberty
is basic if and only if it is necessary to the provision of the social conditions that
must be in place in order for it to be the case that every citizen naturally capable of
doing so is not hindered, by arrangements relating to the basic structure of society
and its laws, from exercising the moral powers in a full and informed way in the
two fundamental cases.
Nevertheless, the appeal to necessity remains too strong. While the connection
between the basic liberties and Rawls’s conception of citizenship in a well-ordered
society is indeed a necessary one, some liberties that ought, at least by Rawlsian
lights, to qualify as particular basic liberties within any just social order are, as
Arnold (2018) has argued, only contingently connected with the full and informed
exercise of the moral powers in the two fundamental cases. Arnold (2018: §4.2)
illustrates this point using various counter-examples to the necessity claim that are
intended to establish that universal full and informed exercise of the moral powers
in the two fundamental cases can be compatible with laws that deprive citizens of
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core liberal freedoms. Here, we summarize just one of them. For Rawls (2005
[1993]: 335), ‘the liberty and integrity of the person’ are ‘violated [. . .] by denial
of freedom of movement’; thus, freedom of movement is a basic liberty. Arnold’s
discussion suggests, however, that if a law were enacted that restricted people’s
freedom of movement to within their metropolitan areas, this would not make it
impossible for every citizen to possess, and exercise in a full and informed way, the
moral powers in the two fundamental cases (cf. Pogge, 2007: 87). While we think it
very unlikely that, under such conditions, every citizen would be able to do this, we
agree with Arnold that it does not seem to be impossible.
A possible move in response to the above argument, so as to secure the status of
such particular core liberal freedoms as basic, might be to give up the appeal to the
two fundamental cases (second phase) but to retain the necessity reading (first
phase). An obvious problem with this suggestion is that it is not clear as to
what might, for the purposes of adjudication between conflicting basic liberties,
replace the appeal to the two fundamental cases.8 Also, even if we find an answer
to this question, another problem presents itself. In the second phase of specifica-
tion, we are not only looking further to specify the basic liberties identified, at a
higher level of abstraction, in the first phase; we must also employ a method of
adjudication. Adjudication requires an account of the relative significance of dif-
ferent liberties. Here, Rawls proposes that:
a liberty is more or less significant depending on whether it is more or less essentially
involved in, or is a more or less necessary institutional means to protect, the full and
informed exercise of the moral powers in one (or both) of the two fundamental cases.
(Rawls, 2001: 113, cf. 2005 [1993]: 335)
Before we discuss this quotation further, let us consider an ambiguity in it. A
sentence of the form ‘A is essentially involved in B’ may be taken to mean either
that A is essential to B (i.e. in this context, that B cannot happen without A) or
(non-equivalently) that A cannot be A without being involved in B (i.e. if A exists
or occurs then, thereby, B does, at least partly, too). We take the first reading to be
the one that is apposite to interpreting Rawls: it accords with Rawls’s own talk of
the basic liberties being (either essentially or instrumentally) necessary for the full
and informed exercise of the moral powers in the fundamental cases (Rawls, 2005
[1993]: 208, cf. 2001: 58).
For simplicity, let us set aside the reference to the two fundamental cases.
Adding them to the present discussion would make no philosophical difference
to our points. The idea is now that the weightings of particular basic liberties,
within ‘a fully adequate scheme’ of basic liberties, once a list of basic liberties
(specified at a high level of abstraction) is already in place, can be guided by
measuring how necessary or essential they are to, or as institutional means to
protect, the full and informed exercise of the two moral powers. This idea, how-
ever, is bizarre. Rawls, when providing his modal definition of the basic liberties,
does not appeal to degrees of essentiality or necessity. In the remark about degrees
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of significance, he does so. A liberty, however, cannot (for example) both be
essential (or necessary) for the adequate development and/or the full and/or
informed exercise of the moral powers and not so essential (or necessary) to
this. Following McLeod (2018: 247), degrees of significance cannot, consistently
with Rawls’s attempt to define the basic liberties, be spelled out in terms of degrees
of essentiality (or necessity).9 Distinguishing between the two phases of specifica-
tion does not help resolve this problem.
While significance admits of degrees, this is not true of necessity (or essential-
ity). Even if there are various notions of necessity that differ in strength, when we
are working with a single notion of necessity there are no degrees within it. While
the significance of a liberty is a scalar property of the liberty, its necessity (or
otherwise) for the full and informed exercise of, or as a necessary institutional
means towards the protection of, the moral powers is a binary property: either a
liberty is so necessary or it is not. If it is not, then it is at best contingently
connected with the full and informed exercise of the moral powers.
Thus, supposing that some particular liberties are more significant than others,
but that the division is not simply between those that are significant and those that
are not, the proper way to cash this out cannot be in terms of degrees of necessity
of the liberties in question to the full and informed exercise, or institutional pro-
tection, of the moral powers. Rather, if differences in degrees of significance of
particular liberties are to be correlated with other gradated differences, then the
appropriate appeal should be to the extent to which it is probable that, in the
absence of a given particular liberty’s taking on the functional role of a basic
liberty, the full or informed exercise of (at least one of) the moral powers will,
partly due to social conditions, be significantly impeded, stunted or atrophy
(McLeod, 2018: 246–247).
We re-emphasize that this observation relates not to how an appropriate list of
basic liberties is to be drawn up in the first phase but, rather, to the question of
how, in the second phase, particular basic liberties are to be ranked in a fully
adequate scheme of liberties. In defining what it is for a liberty to be basic, instead
of appealing, as Rawls does, to a purported modal relationship between the basic
liberties and the full and informed exercise of the moral powers in the two funda-
mental cases (or the institutional protection of liberties intrinsically related to this),
we introduce the idea of mitigating against risk, above a certain threshold, to the
full and informed exercise of the two moral powers. Accordingly, let us consider
the suggestion that a liberty is basic if and only if the likelihood is above a certain
threshold that, in its absence, and partly due to social conditions, the possession and/
or the full and informed exercise of one or both of the moral powers will be prevented,
stunted or atrophied.
Let us explain how we think that this suggestion improves upon Rawls’s
account. For Rawls, the first phase of specification appeals to the supposed neces-
sity of the basic liberties to the full and informed exercise of (or, in some cases,
institutional protection of liberties intrinsically related to) the moral powers. In the
second phase, and so as to identify the core areas of the basic liberties, he
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introduces the appeal to the two fundamental cases. Finally, his account of how
adjudication between the resultant particular liberties works, within an overall
scheme of liberties, uses the notion of degrees of necessity (essentiality). We replace
the modal notion in Rawls’s account, necessity, with the non-modal notion of
probability. Thus, a basic liberty is a liberty in the absence of which the risk to
the possession, and/or the full and informed exercise, of the moral powers rises
above a certain threshold. Again by contrast with Rawls’s account, this new gen-
eral condition is apt for deployment in both phases of specification of the basic
liberties: nothing needs to be added to it to cope with the second phase. A remain-
ing task for the second phase, on both Rawls’s account and according to our new
suggestion, concerns the weighting of, and the adjudication between, the particular
basic liberties within an overall scheme of liberties. Here our idea is simple.
Adjudication proceeds using probability assessment above the specified threshold
of risk. That is, we compare (ordinally or cardinally) the different risk levels to
each other so as to measure the relative significance of different particular basic
liberties. If the absence of a certain liberty would pose a higher risk to the posses-
sion of, and/or the full and informed exercise of, the moral powers than another,
then the first of these liberties is more significant than the second.
We take it that our appeal to probability, in place of necessity, is no ad hoc
move to save a broadly Rawlsian account of the basic liberties. If, in an account of
the basic liberties, one wishes to retain Rawls’s appeal to the moral powers then
this appears to be the only way to proceed: at least, it seems to be the only plausible
proposal on the table. Arnold’s imaginary example provides a good illustration.
His objection to Rawls’s account withers away when necessity is supplanted, along
the lines we suggest, with the appeal to a probability threshold.
Of course, a lot depends on how and where the threshold is set. It is neither
crucial nor desirable that this question should be settled here and now. Our con-
cern has been to arrive at general conditions apt for deployment in any process of
analytical specification of the basic liberties. The identification of these conditions
is a philosophical task that takes place outside of the four-stage sequence.
Application of the analytical method, via which a list of particular basic liberties
is drawn up, is a process that happens across the stages of the four-stage sequence
and which, on both Rawls’s own modal account and on its probabilistic counter-
part, increasingly involves empirical enquiry. This is also true of threshold-setting.
Now, according to some theorists (Miklos, 2011; Miklosi, 2008), the stages of the
four-stage sequence see institutions, such as those constitutive of the basic struc-
ture of society, as determining moral content by carrying out, among other things,
just the kind of specification job needed to make the above probabilistic approach
work. Rawls’s own discussion of the four-stage sequence further underlines this
idea. It shows that specification and adjudication take place in an institutional
setting and that the constitutional, legislative and executive stages interact: they
feed material into each other with theorists going back and forth between them, as
would be expected in a process of reflective equilibrium (Rawls, 1971: §31, 2005
[1993]: 334–356).
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To apply this framework to our case, what would happen, we surmise, is not so
much that participants in these stages would literally discuss a threshold (although
that can happen, e.g. in the work of the courts) but that they would come up with
guidelines designed to reflect the abstract account given by the theorists, hand over
their ‘results’ to the theorists (who could then apply them in the theory) and then
repeat this process, going back and forth between the theorists and the other
participants.10 The emerging picture, then, is that of a process for setting the
threshold that harmonizes with Rawls’s ideas about the role of institutions with
respect to justice.
The probabilistic approach: An outstanding problem
When discussing Rawls’s modal definition of the basic liberties, in terms of their
supposed necessity to the full and adequate possession and exercise of the moral
powers in the two fundamental cases, we agreed with Arnold that some of the core
areas of basic liberties that instantiate liberties, more abstractly specified, in
Rawls’s list of the basic liberties are not necessary in this way. Thus, the modal
definition is extensionally inadequate because it under-generates when applied in
the second phase of specification. Unfortunately, the probabilistic approach is
vulnerable to counter-examples that show it to be extensionally inadequate in
the same way. One such counter-example is the freedom to produce or to consume
political satire.
Freedom of political satire presents a dilemma for the probabilistic approach.
Suppose, for the first horn of the dilemma, that any satirical content can be con-
veyed non-satirically. (In doing this, suppose that the content of political satire can
exhaustively be expressed, as, for example, some philosophers hold that the con-
tent of a metaphorical sentence can exhaustively be expressed, in literal lan-
guage.11) Suppose, further, that the probability is high that the content of any
given piece of putative political satire that agents would otherwise be inclined to
create will instead be expressed non-satirically should political satire be legally
debarred. Other things being equal, it follows that freedom of political satire is
not, on the probabilistic approach, a core area of the related basic liberty (namely
freedom of speech) because (under these suppositions) the equivalence of expres-
sions of satire (whatsoever their format, so including mere images) to literal lan-
guage means that a ban on political satire would not, of itself, make it likely that
the full and informed exercise of the moral powers (in the two fundamental cases)
would be stunted or atrophy. Under our suppositions for his horn of the dilemma,
even if political satire were legally debarred (supposing, contrary, we assume, to
fact, that sufficiently precise legislation could be drafted, passed and implemented),
the content of its message would, other things being equal, readily be effectively
communicable, as no merely theoretical possibility, by non-satirical means.
Accordingly, citizens’ exercise of the capacity for a sense of justice would not be
precluded from being full and informed: for neither full nor informed exercise of a
moral power requires that for every manner of conveying facts and judgements
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about the justice of the basic structure and its laws citizens can legally have those
facts and judgements conveyed to them in that manner. It is each citizen’s posses-
sion of an adequate stock of relevant information, alongside access to that stock of
relevant information that is possessed by the citizen’s epistemic community, that
matters here. It is not how the information is conveyed that matters. A restriction
on the latter does not result, of itself, in compromise to the full and informed
exercise of the relevant moral power in the relevant fundamental case.
Now suppose, on the other hand, and for the second horn of the dilemma, that
political satire can include satirical content that is not literally expressible. The case
of a law banning political satire can then be contrasted with Rawls’s discussion of
the repression of ‘subversive advocacy’. He writes:
As Kalven observes, revolutionaries don’t simply shout: ‘Revolt! Revolt!’ They give
reasons. To suppress subversive advocacy is to suppress the discussion of these rea-
sons, and to do this is to restrict the free and informed public use of reason in judging
the justice of the basic structure and its social policies. And thus the basic liberty of
freedom of thought is violated. (Rawls, 2005 [1993]: 346)
On this horn of the dilemma, political satire can include rhetorical elements that
outstrip reasons (since, for example, it can consist of an image alone). We presume
that it is an essential feature of reasons that they can feature as premises in
inferences (whether within theoretical or within practical reasoning).12 We take
it, therefore, that reasons can be stated in literal language. If reasons can be stated
in literal language, while (on this horn of the dilemma) not all satirical content can
so be stated, a law against political satire cannot be criticized (on this horn) for
being a restriction on the free and informed public use of reason; for (on this horn)
it is not that. It is, at best, a restriction on the free and informed use of rhetoric (i.e.
in this case, the manner in which reasons are expressed). Given that the proba-
bilistic approach to defining the basic liberties preserves, from Rawls’s modal
definition, the end relative to which the basic liberties are to be defined, namely,
the full and informed exercise of the moral powers, the probabilistic approach is
unable to secure freedom of political satire as a basic liberty.
The outcome of this dilemma is that the end relative to which Rawls defines the
basic liberties is too narrow to encompass freedom of political satire.13
It might be objected that the proper response to this dilemma is to bite the bullet
and to accept that freedom of political satire simply does not count as a particular
liberty that qualifies as basic. Freedom of political satire might still be apt for
political protection, but whatever political protection it enjoyed would not be the
special protection that is afforded to the basic liberties. We decline to bite the
bullet. First, we hold that there are good reasons to take freedom of political
satire to be a core area of freedom of (political) speech (and, more widely, of
expression and, hence, of thought), which in turn is a core area of the group of
basic liberties that Rawls calls ‘political liberties’.14 We think that the status
of freedom of political satire as a core basic liberty is clear.15 In many repressive
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regimes, and even in particularly sensitive cases in non-repressive regimes, the most
effective method of social critique is sometimes through highly abstract satirical
pieces: indeed, sometimes this is the only legally or politically available method.
Second, we believe that there are good reasons to think that freedom of political
satire should be afforded the kind of protection that is afforded only to the basic
liberties. The approach to political liberty that is embedded within Rawlsian lib-
eralism already has readily available resources to accept this claim. On Rawls’s
view, if a liberty is basic then, within its ‘central range of application’, only restric-
tions upon it that promote the overall balance of basic liberties within a scheme of
liberty can be justified (Rawls, 1971: 244, 2001: 111, 2005 [1993]: 295; also
Freeman, 2007: 65–72, 81–82). Our task now is to show that freedom of political
satire indeed falls within the central range of application of freedom of expression
(and thought).
Let us begin by contrasting political satire with non-political satire. The free-
dom to produce or consume non-political satire, for example about the consensual
sexual antics of stars of ‘reality’ television, while also an instance of the more
abstract liberty of freedom of expression, does not have the special protection
afforded to the basic liberties. This is because, in the case of this type of satire,
the realm (i.e. in this case, the subject matter) of the exercise of the more abstract
liberty is largely irrelevant to the full and informed exercise of one or both of the
moral powers. Notably, this sort of non-political satire does not concern ‘the jus-
tice of the basic structure and its social policies’ (Rawls, 2001: 112). The more
important forms of political satire do not just ridicule or draw attention to unjust
aspects of the basic structure and its social policies; they encourage their audience
to do so too (at least attitudinally, if not out loud).
In accordance with its liberal nature, a Rawlsian account of freedom of expres-
sion must reckon, when assessing whether particular liberties that instantiate this
freedom are to be afforded special protection, not only with the content of the
expression but also with the multiplicity of ways in which that content may be
expressed. Restrictions upon freedom of expression come in three broad forms:
of the message (e.g. one is not allowed to criticize the head of state), of the medium
(e.g. one is not allowed to criticize the head of state in print) and of the manner in
which the message is expressed (e.g. one is not allowed to publish satire that
lampoons the head of state). Crucially, freedom of expression is not only freedom
to express the content of the message: it is freedom of medium, and of manner, too.
We consider restrictions on the medium, or on the manner, that do not serve to
promote the balance of particular liberties in an overall scheme of liberties to be, in
the spirit of Rawls’s high liberalism, just like restrictions on the expression of the
content of the message, unjustifiable. That is, if there are many ways in which a
particular basic liberty, such as freedom of political expression, may be exercised
then the state cannot be within its rights arbitrarily to rule that only some of them,
specified at an even lower level of abstraction, are allowed.
If a particular liberty is non-basic, then, in principle, there can be restrictions
upon it that do not promote the overall balance of basic liberties within a scheme
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of liberty: this is so because of the particular liberty’s realm. When a particular
liberty is an instance of a basic liberty, then, while this does not of itself confer
basic status upon that particular liberty, we suggest that the mere availability of an
alternative manner of exercising that particular liberty is not enough to render it
permissible for the state, for a reason other than the promotion of the overall
balance of basic liberties within a scheme of liberty, to restrict that particular
liberty. Since freedom of political satire is a particular instance of freedom of
political expression, restrictions upon it could only be permissible for reasons of
realm. There can be no such reasons, because the realm of freedom of political
satire is exactly that of freedom of political, but non-satirical, expression. Political
satire, even if it is not necessary for evaluation of the justice of the basic structure
and its social policies, includes such evaluation in its characteristic subject matter.
We conclude that freedom of political satire is on a par, in terms of its significance,
with freedom of political but non-satirical expression.
Arbitrary coercion and the principle of legitimacy
Given that every version of the analytical method that we have so far discussed is
extensionally inadequate, how are we to provide appropriate general conditions
for the analytic method? We believe that progress can be made via appeal to the
standard liberal injunction against arbitrary coercion. From a purely Rawlsian
perspective, this injunction is embodied in a more specific principle that underlies
Rawls’s political liberalism, namely ‘the liberal principle of legitimacy’ which states
that ‘political power is legitimate only when it is exercised in accordance with a
constitution (written or unwritten) the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable
and rational, can endorse in the light of their common human reason’ (Rawls,
2001: 41, cf. 2005 [1993]: 137).16
In our discussion of Rawls’s modal approach to the provision of general con-
ditions for analytical specification of the basic liberties, we focused on what we
took to be an under-generation problem. From the various examples provided by
Arnold, we used the case of freedom to move outside of one’s own metropolitan
area to illustrate this under-generation problem. Like Arnold, and Pogge before
him, we did not argue that this freedom is a matter of basic liberty. Instead, we
took it as rather obvious that it is, and, accordingly, that the failure of Rawls’s
modal approach thus to recognize it was a case of unintended failure of extensional
adequacy.
In seeking to fix that problem, we suggested that Rawls’s modal approach might
be replaced by a probabilistic approach. That, we claimed, also suffers from an
under-generation problem in that it does not provide for the inclusion of freedom
of political satire within the basic liberties. In that case, we argued that freedom of
political satire is a kind of freedom that should be regarded as basic by any liber-
alism worthy of the name. The failure of the previously discussed approaches to
encompass that freedom is, we suggest, again an unintended failure of extensional
adequacy.
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If that is correct then an improved approach must, without resort to over-
generation, resolve this under-generation problem. Moreover, it is desirable to
explain the basic status of freedom of political satire in a manner that does not
rest only on a particular feature of that freedom, but that also generalizes to
other cases, such as freedom of movement outside of one’s own metropolitan
area. Our argument, in the previous section, that freedom of political satire is
basic appeals to features that are specific to its status as a form of freedom of
political thought and expression. We will now establish its status as basic in a
more general way, that encompasses other particular freedoms, and that is inde-
pendent of the specific features of freedom of political satire to which our earlier
argument appealed.
The source of the under-generation problem resides, we suggest, in a wider
failing with the modal and probabilistic approaches to the provision of general
conditions fit for deployment in analytical specifications of the basic liberties. In
relating the basic liberties exclusively to the full and informed exercise of the two
moral powers, either insufficient attention or no attention at all is paid to what
must be regarded, by any political philosophy fit to brand itself as liberal, to issues
of coercion and, in particular, to cases of what are, from any liberal perspective,
arbitrary exercises of political power.
Accordingly, we propose that a general condition that is genuinely apt for
deployment when specifying the basic liberties analytically will be along the fol-
lowing, disjunctive, lines. An entitlement is a basic right or liberty if and only if at
least one of the following conditions holds:
(i) the likelihood is above a certain threshold that, in its absence, and
partly due to social conditions, the possession and/or the full and informed
exercise of one or both of the moral powers will be prevented, stunted or
atrophied;
(ii) any legal restriction upon it that did not promote the weighting of liberties in a
scheme of liberty would be arbitrarily coercive, i.e. an arbitrary exercise of
political power.
Rawls operates with a specific understanding of what arbitrarily wielded polit-
ical power is and of why it is unacceptable. In his thought, the principle of legit-
imacy serves to set out a necessary but non-sufficient condition upon the morally
acceptable exercise of political power. By ‘political power’, he means nothing but
coercion by the state: it ‘is always coercive power backed by the government’s use
of sanctions’ (Rawls, 2005 [1993]: 136, cf. 216). Moreover, ‘in a democracy political
power [. . .] is the power of the public, that is, of free and equal citizens as a
collective body’ (Rawls, 2005 [1993]: 216). The principle of legitimacy therefore
imposes upon citizens ‘the duty of civility – to be able to explain to one another’,
concerning fundamental questions, ‘how the principles and policies they advocate
and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason’ (Rawls, 2005
McLeod and Tanyi 15
[1993]: 217, cf. 143–144). Rawls (2005 [1993]: 446–447) depicts the principle of
legitimacy, grounded in the principle of reciprocity, as follows:
our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the
reasons we offer for our political actions—were we to state them as government
officials—are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other citizens might also
reasonably accept those reasons. This criterion applies on two levels: one is to the
constitutional structure itself, the other is to particular statutes and laws enacted in
accordance with that structure.
An exercise of state power will be arbitrary, on Rawls’s account, then, when it
breaches the principle of legitimacy thus stated: that is, when it constitutes a breach
of the reciprocity that is integral to public reason and to his conception of citizens
as free and equal parties to social co-operation. Indeed, Rawls (2005 [1993]: 447)
writes that denial of a basic liberty normally involves a failure to observe the
principle of reciprocity. Of course, liberal alternatives to Rawls’s specific under-
standing of arbitrary coercion, of its wrongfulness, and to his principles of legit-
imacy and reciprocity, are available. We have therefore worded (ii) in a way that
we intend to be neutral across different liberal accounts of these matters.
The adoption of our new, disjunctive condition, rather than the abandonment
of the project of providing general conditions fit for use in any analytical specifi-
cation, is vindicated by the fact that the principle of legitimacy, and the concep-
tions of reciprocity and public reason from which it derives, are all at the core of
Rawls’s political-liberal account of justice. Our approach, then, does not involve
an ad hoc move. In particular, our new general condition, although disjunctive, is
united in that the concepts in each disjunct that are most salient to the political-
liberal account of justice have the very same foundations. Rawls’s conception of
persons as ‘free and equal beings with a liberty to choose’ (Rawls, 1971: 256),
although prior historically to Rawls’s version of the principle of legitimacy and
to the integration into his theorizing of considerations about the moral powers,
underlies not only (i) but also (ii)’s injunction, manifested in Rawls’s case by the
principle of legitimacy, against arbitrary coercion. Rawls’s writings clearly show
that the principle of legitimacy, which justifies (ii) from a specifically Rawlsian
perspective, is rooted in the fundamental ideas of the person (citizen) and of soci-
ety, the exact two foundational reference points for the moral powers that are
mentioned in (i) as well.17 Moreover, there is good reason to read Rawls as sug-
gesting that the principle of legitimacy is a constraint on reasoning about (and
therefore, upon the determination of any fully adequate scheme of) the basic lib-
erties.18 In seeking to solve the under-generation problem that has exercised us, our
invocation of the liberal hostility to the arbitrary exercise of political power, in
Rawls’s specific case articulated via the principle of legitimacy, is therefore by no
means an ad hoc move.
Let us relate (ii) to the two under-generation cases previously discussed, namely
freedom of movement outside one’s metropolitan area and freedom of political
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satire. From a liberal perspective, a law that restricted people’s movements to
within their own metropolitan areas, and which did not promote the weighting
of liberties in a scheme of liberty, would be wrong not because, or not primarily
because, of prejudicial effects on the full and informed exercise of the moral
powers. Rather, its wrongness would reside primarily in its constituting an arbi-
trary exercise of political power.
We think that (ii) captures exactly what would, from a liberal perspective, and
independently of the particular features of freedom of political satire to which we
appealed in the previous section, be wrong with a ban on political satire. Now that
we have invoked (ii), doing so in Rawls’s specific case via the principle of legiti-
macy, a further particular feature of freedom of political satire becomes salient.
From a Rawlsian perspective, one of the most worthwhile aspects of freedom of
political satire is that it is freedom to highlight, and to ridicule, exercises of political
power that are improper, in that they are not founded on reasons that, on their
merits, are sincerely believed to be ones that citizens might reasonably accept.
More broadly, political satire highlights, and ridicules, the attitudes, beliefs and
behaviours associated with the arbitrary exercise of political power.
One might still object to our proposal on the ground that condition (ii) renders
condition (i) redundant because every liberty that meets (ii) also meets (i) but, as
the case of freedom of political satire shows, not vice versa. This objection fails.
Legislation that stipulates fixed-term parliaments puts a restriction on the exercise
of the right to vote, and not to promote the overall weighting of liberties in a
scheme of liberty. However, such legislation is not a case of arbitrary coercion.
While (i), and not (ii), secures the right of universal suffrage, (ii), and not (i),
secures freedom of movement outside of one’s metropolitan area and freedom of
political satire.
A final objection to our proposal is that, in dampening down the bump in the
carpet concerning freedom of political satire, we have caused another bump to
appear. Rawls (2005 [1993]: 364–365) writes that the right to advertise, while a
form of freedom of speech, is not a basic liberty because, in the case of ‘market-
strategic advertising’, the right to advertise ‘can be restricted by contract, and there-
fore [. . .] is not inalienable’. Does our lowering of the bar on what it is to be a basic
liberty not, in admitting freedom of political satire, also have the undesirable result,
for Rawls, that the right to engage in market-strategic advertising also turns out to
be a basic liberty? It does not. Restrictions on market-strategic advertising, even if
these are legally imposed (as opposed to just being contractually agreed), can be
consistent with the principle of legitimacy and need not amount to arbitrary coer-
cion. This is because reasonable and rational people may agree with Rawls (2005
[1993]: 365) that market-strategic advertising can be socially wasteful.
Conclusion
Both the question as to which liberties are basic and the nature of the analytical
method of specifying the basic liberties are significantly under-theorized in the
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literature. This is despite the clear importance of the notion of basic liberties for
liberal political theories.
We have emphasized, after Rawls, that any theory of the basic liberties must
distinguish between two phases of specification: in the first, a highly abstract list of
liberties is drawn up under general headings; in the second, this list is further
specified into core areas of these liberties (that matter in ‘real life’) and adjudica-
tion takes place. It seems to us that much of the existing literature tends to entangle
these two phases, insufficiently distinguishing between them.
In the framework provided by this distinction, we gave an account of Rawls’s
characterization of the analytical method of specifying the basic liberties as cen-
tring on a necessary connection between the basic liberties and the full and
informed exercise of the two moral powers (first phase) in the two fundamental
cases (second phase). We then argued that Rawls’s appeal, in his definition of the
basic liberties, to a modal relationship should be replaced instead by the appeal to
a probability threshold. Using the case of freedom of political satire, we argued
that even a probabilistic general condition under-generates. We remedied this by
disjoining probabilistic considerations with a clause that makes direct appeal to the
liberal injunction against arbitrary coercion.
While our proposed approach is motivated by purely analytical considerations,
the concept of basic liberty that it involves is more inclusive, in terms of the rights
and liberties that fall under it, than is the letter of Rawls’s own discussion. The case
of freedom of political satire is but one example among many. For example, while
O’Neill (2008: 41–42) may be right that an element of workplace democracy is not
necessary to the full and informed exercise of the moral powers, this does not settle
the question of whether a right to an element of workplace democracy is basic (cf.
McLeod, 2018). The same applies to the laissez-faire economic freedoms, such as
freedom of contract, that Tomasi (2012a, 2012b) regards as basic liberties. The
question to ask about each freedom, provided that it is not the case that any legal
restriction upon it that did not promote the weighting of liberties in a scheme of
liberty would be arbitrarily coercive, is whether its lack would raise above the
threshold risk to the full and informed exercise of the moral powers. Empirical
psychology and social science therefore have even greater roles to play than Rawls
thought.
We hope to have assisted a broadly Rawlsian account of the basic liberties in
defending itself against criticisms from thinkers both to the left and to the right
of Rawls. As noted earlier, the discussion about the correct list of basic liberties
is not merely a theoretical exercise in ‘list-drawing’. It is also, and perhaps first
and foremost, a debate about the fate of liberalism. While that fate is decided not
merely by theoretical disputes but also by the many practical, and especially
institutional, facets of liberal democracies (Benhabib, 2019), attaining a clear
and nuanced understanding of the most important theoretical issues is crucial
to deciding which liberalism, if any, to accept. We hope to have contributed to
that effort.
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Notes
1. See also Flanigan (2018). For criticism of Tomasi’s view, see Arnold (2013); Brennan
(2020); Melenovsky and Bernstein (2015); Patten (2014); Stilz (2014); von Platz (2014);
Wall (2013); Wells (2018). Cowen (2021: Ch. 12 & 14) argues, on somewhat different
grounds to Tomasi, that economic liberties not regarded as basic by Rawls do qualify.
2. Cf. Rawls (2005 [1993]: 340–356) on freedom of expression.
3. The liberty principle does not itself list the basic liberties. Rather, as Rawls (2001: 42)
states the principle, it merely mentions them as a class. Within a society, application of
the first principle, in combination with a list of basic liberties that has been drawn up via
one of the three available methods, is part of what specifies ‘the fair terms of social co-
operation’.
4. Cf. O’Neill (2008: 35–36); Wells (2018: §1). Following von Platz (2014: 41 note 9), the
first ‘and’ in the definition should read ‘and/or’. Presumably, so should the second
‘and’. Henceforth, we make these amendments. Rawls (2005 [1993]: 308) refers to ‘the
social conditions necessary for the development and the full and informed exercise of
the two moral powers (particularly in [. . .] “the two fundamental cases”)’. Thus, for
Rawls, ‘essential’ and ‘necessary’ are presumably interchangeable terms when defining
the basic liberties.
5. For an opposing opinion, with which we agree, see Hsieh (2005: 118). Rawls (2001: 45)
seems to confuse the analytical method itself with a determinate specification of the
general conditions apt for deployment within it.
6. Freeman (2007: 55) defines the basic liberties following Rawls (2005 [1993]: 293), omit-
ting mention of the two fundamental cases.
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7. For example, Nickel (1994: 772–773) claims that what we must show to recognize a
liberty as basic is that it is a primary good. Relatedly, von Platz (2014: 28) observes
(without endorsing the view) that one way of rejecting Rawls’s argument that not all
economic liberties are basic is ‘to reject the modality of necessity’ in the definition of the
basic liberties and to appeal, instead, to the claim that ‘the basic liberties are protections
that are conducive to or promote the development and exercise of the two moral
powers’. Cf. Brennan (2020: 503); Wall (2013: 524), crediting Brennan.
8. We know of two proposals in the literature, from Nickel (1994: 782–783) and Pogge
(2007: 87–88). Pogge argues against his own proposal (we think rightly). It is doubtful as
to whether Nickel’s proposal can accommodate the problem that we discuss in the next
section.
9. This point is somewhat anticipated by Wall (2013: 525), although his observation is
merely about the oddness of Rawls’s linguistic usage.
10. Rawls (2005 [1993]: 340–356) does this when he ‘translates’ his own proposal into an
account of the thinking of the Supreme Court about free political speech.
11. Lycan (2000: Ch. 14) provides an introductory discussion of metaphor.
12. This view bears clear affinity to the so-called reasoning view of reasons (Setiya, 2014;
Silverstein, 2016; Way, 2017). There is no denial here that, for example, an image can
stimulate reasoning. Rather, our point is that things, such as images, that cannot be
premises cannot be reasons.
13. If there be citizens among whose conceptions of the good producing or consuming
political satire is included, this is a purely contingent matter. Also, appealing to the
case of such citizens would be an example of what Melenovsky and Bernstein (2015: 53)
call an ‘argument from particular interests’, to which they rightly object that the ‘fact
that a way of life is important to an individual is not sufficient to show that we should
[on Rawlsian grounds] protect the liberties that are useful—or even necessary—to pur-
suing that way of life’.
14. Rawls (2001: 92, 113, 2005 [1993]: 341–344) seems to agree. Cf. Cohen (1994: 592);
Freeman (2007: 47); Nickel (1994: 771–772).
15. This is implied by Freeman (2007: 74) and Nussbaum (2002: 509). Also, Rawls (2001:
92) writes that ‘public reason is the form of reasoning appropriate to equal citizens who
as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power’.
He continues: ‘shared guidelines for inquiry and methods of reasoning make that reason
public, while freedom of speech and thought in a constitutional regime make that reason
free’. A ban on political satire would mean that public reason was not free.
16. See further Langvatn (2016); Patton (2015); Rossi (2014); Song (2012); Wenar (2017: §3.1).
17. As we have seen, the principle of reciprocity provides a clear link here (Rawls, 1997:
770–771, 2001: 91–92, 2005 [1993]: xliv, 19, 52, 137, 217; also Freeman, 2007: 374–377).
Glod (2010: 194–196) makes a similar move to ours, as does Tomasi (2012a: 65–67,
2012b: 75).
18. For example, Rawls (2001: 92) writes that ‘one aspect of’ the duty of civility that is
rooted in the ideal of citizenship ‘directs us, when constitutional essentials and questions
of basic justice are involved, to reason within the limits set by the principle of legitima-
cy’. Also, Rawls (2005 [1993]: 137 note 5) suggests that the principles of justice adopted
by the parties in the original position ‘would in effect incorporate’ the principle of
legitimacy. The principle is at the theoretical core of political liberalism and of justice
as fairness as articulated in Rawls (1997, 2001, 2005 [1993]): see Langvatn (2016).
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